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Collective bargaining has a long history. The term is said to have been coined around 1890 
by the British labour movement pioneer, Beatrice Webb. 1   By then the practice of wage 
negotiations between trade unions and employers was already well-established in Britain 
and a number of other countries. In the decades that followed it became a key instrument 
of labour market regulation throughout the industrialized and industrializing world, including 
South Africa. 
The importance of collective bargaining can be explained by the fact that it has value for 
employers as well as workers - for employers, as a means of maintaining 'industrial peace'; 
for workers, primarily as a means of maintaining 'certain standards of distribution of work, 
of rewards and of stability of employment'. 2   The qualifier 'primarily' is important: power 
built up in the bargaining arena enables trade unions also to engage with broader issues 
and exert political pressure. 3   While 
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not ignoring this fact, this article concentrates on collective bargaining in its primary role as 
an instrument of labour market regulation. 
As such, its fortunes have waxed and waned. Closely associated with democracy and the 
struggle for social justice, trade unions and collective bargaining have periodically been 
suppressed by dictatorial regimes - for example, in Germany during 1933-1945; in Chile 
during 1973-1989 - but have always re-emerged under conditions of political democracy or 
as a harbinger of democracy. South Africa in the mid-1970s is but one example. 
During the decades of economic upswing after World War II collective bargaining may be 
said to have reached a historical peak. By the 1960s it was the norm in much of the 
industrialized world as well as a growing number of former colonial countries. Its status was 
reflected in the adoption of core conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
upholding the right to collective bargaining and their ratification by the vast majority of ILO 
member states. 4   Labour law as a modern discipline was shaped during this period. 
This period, too, has ended. Structural changes in the production process and the labour 
market since the 1970s, generally referred to as 'globalization', have impacted severely on 
trade union organization and collective bargaining institutions world-wide. It would be an 
exaggeration to say that the survival of collective bargaining, or that of labour law, is at 
stake. Both are, however, faced with major challenges in adapting to fundamentally 
changed (and still changing) conditions. This question, viewed from a South African 
perspective, forms the focus of the article. 
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Kahn-Freund, in his seminal theory of labour law developed in Britain before and after World 
War II, asserted a basic nexus between collective bargaining and labour law. 5   The 
starting-point is the inequality of bargaining power between employer and employee. The 
relationship between an employer and a worker, in Kahn-Freund's famous phrase, 'is 
typically a relation between a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power'. 6   
The law itself can do little to equalize the imbalance. In general, 7   workers can match the 
power of their (often corporate) employers only by acting collectively. Not only does this put 
them in a bargaining position; it is necessary also to 
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enforce their rights in practice. 'Legal norms', as Kahn-Freund put it, 'cannot often be 
effective unless they are backed by ... the countervailing power of trade unions and of the 
organised workers'. 8 
From this perspective, the 'central purpose of labour law is that of maintaining an 
equilibrium between employers and workers by ensuring the effective operation of a 
voluntary system of collective bargaining'. 9   The law, in other words, should protect the 
institutions of collective bargaining but maintain a hands-off attitude towards the bargaining 
process itself. That process, and its outcomes, should be determined by the interests and 
the power of organized labour and employers. For this reason the term 'legal abstentionism' 
is often associated with Kahn-Freund's approach. 10   Collective bargaining, thus conceived, 
was characterized as 'collective laissez-faire '; its 'autonomy' was and continues to be seen 
as a 'fundamental principle'. 11 
The picture has become more complicated since then. In its classical sense, perhaps, 
'collective laissez-faire ' could only ever have existed under the conditions of relative 
stability and sustained economic growth experienced in the industrialized countries during 
the 1950s and 1960s. As economic growth faltered, the picture began to change. In one 
sense, the impact of collective agreements on labour markets and increasingly fragile 
economies was simply too great to be left entirely to the self-interest of trade unions and 
employers. Starting with the battle to contain inflation and government spending amidst 
growing international competition, 12   the autonomy of collective bargaining became 
increasingly circumscribed by incomes policies, social 
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pacts, tripartite institutions and other devices aimed at bringing bargaining outcomes into 
line with broader policy objectives. 13 
Even greater pressures have emanated from the processes collectively referred to as 
'globalization' from the early 1980s onwards. Dicken explains it as follows: 
 'Until recently, the production process itself took place primarily within national boundaries. Today the picture is 
very different: national boundaries no longer act as 'watertight' containers of the production process .... 
[F]ewer and fewer activities are oriented towards local - or even national - markets. More and more have 
meaning only in a regional or global context .... These developments signify the emergence of a new global 
division of labour , a transformation of the old geographical pattern of specialisation, in which the industrialised 
countries produced manufactured goods and the non-industrialised countries supplied raw materials and 
agricultural products to the industrialised countries and acted as a market for some manufactured goods .... 
The straightforward exchange between core and peripheral areas has been transformed into a highly complex, 
kaleidoscopic structure involving the fragmentation of many production processes and their geographical 
relocation on a global scale in ways that slice through national boundaries. Both old and new economic activities 
are involved in this resorting of the global jigsaw puzzle in ways that also reflect the development of [new] 
technologies of transportation and communications, of corporate organization and of the production process 
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itself. Technologies of production are undergoing substantial and far-reaching change as the emphasis on 
large-scale, mass production assembly-line techniques has shifted towards more flexible methods.' 14 
The implications for organized labour and collective bargaining were, and are, profound. 
'Large-scale, mass production assembly-line techniques', employing large numbers of 
workers under relatively uniform conditions, were the historical basis of trade unions and 
collective bargaining. A union's bargaining power depended on its ability to control a (l) 
labour market by recruiting a significant number of its participants as members. That power 
is dissipated by the dispersal of the production process, and with it the labour market, 
across national boundaries. At the same time, employers find themselves competing with 
rivals around the world and encountering new limits to the bargaining agenda. These 
developments pose a serious dilemma for trade unions, whose efforts to extend their own 
reach internationally lag far behind the international mobility of capital. 15 
Having said that, the autonomy of the bargaining process remains its most durable core. 
Effective workplace governance requires a process 
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whereby employers and workers can collectively articulate their vital but competing 
interests and translate these into mutually acceptable rules. This, in turn, cannot happen 
without joint negotiation in some shape or form. Arguably, collective bargaining is the best 
mechanism thus far developed for this purpose. 16   At one level it is an alternative to the 
dictatorship of capital or permanent industrial war, neither of which is sustainable. Its 
vitality, however, is bound up with the fact that it requires neither side to lay down their 
weapons. On the contrary, it is accepted that each side operates as a check on the other, 
and a balance of power between them is the best guarantor of stability. 
This inherent connection between work, collective organization and the use of power is 
captured in the often-cited words of former Canadian Chief Justice Dickson: 
 'Work is one of the most fundamental aspects of a person's life, and the role of the association has always been 
vital as a means of protecting the essential needs and interests of individual working people by overcoming 
their vulnerability to the strength of their employers. The capacity to bargain collectively has long been 
recognized as an integral and primary function of associations of working people, and closely related to the 
right to strike. Accordingly, effective constitutional protection of the associational interests of employees in the 
collective bargaining process requires concomitant protection of their freedom to withdraw their services.' 17 
Similarly, a European research report stresses the role of collective bargaining as 'a 
complement to legislation' that offers - 
 'a more flexible and tailored (and more acceptable and workable) approach in the promotion of equality; 
developing positive measures to promote equality rather than simply measures to counter discrimination; and 
giving women and men a voice in shaping their own working conditions, enabling them to define their own 
needs and interests and to set their own priorities'. 18 
For all these reasons it may be argued that legal regulation and protection of collective 
bargaining remains a social imperative. 
At the same time, a different view has gained ground in recent decades. If collective 
bargaining fulfils a social need, it is asked, why does it need legal protection? The 
alternative, from this standpoint, is not necessarily to dismantle its structures but merely to 
withdraw legal protection - in other words, to abandon the 'central purpose of labour law' 
according to Kahn-Freund - and leave the institution to find its own level of real social 
support. At its most extreme, this view (often termed 'neo-liberal' or 'free market') assumes 
that trade unions and collective bargaining are obstructive to the flexibility demanded 
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by global markets; remove 'artificial' regulation, it is implied, and the problem will go away. 
19 
Ironically, it is the growing domination of world markets by big corporations that lends most 
force to the 'free market' perspective. The relationship between the multinational employer 
and the national trade union has become, to a significant extent, 'a relation between a 
bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power'. Under these circumstances, legal 
regulation may be critical to the operation of trade unions and the collective bargaining 
process. Labour market 'deregulation', however, has emerged as a widely perceived 
imperative for countries seeking to attract investment. 20   Deregulation has been 
described as 'a global phenomenon, borne on the rapidly rising tide of technological 
innovation and consequent globalisation of markets'. 21   Excluding 'collectively-based 
regulatory strategies' from the workplace, however, 'privileges the will of management over 
that of the worker'. 22   Nowhere has this been demonstrated more clearly than in Australia 
where a series of statutory amendments since 1996 have brought 'a concerted push away 
from collective bargaining, towards individual bargaining'. 23 
This is not to suggest that law is the ultimate guarantor of collective bargaining. According 
to Kahn-Freund, 'the effectiveness of the law depends on the unions more than the unions 
depend on the effectiveness of the law'. 24   From this standpoint, the role of the law is to 
create space for collective bargaining to evolve. The courts should therefore show 'a degree 
of deference' to the institutions of collective bargaining, recognizing 'the complexity and 
delicacy of the balance sought to be struck by legislation among the interests of labour, 
management, and the public'. 25   As Justice McIntyre of the Canadian Supreme Court 
observed: 
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 'Labour law ... is a fundamentally important as well as an extremely sensitive subject. It is based upon a 
political and economic compromise between organized labour - a very powerful socio-economic force - on the 
one hand, and the employers of labour - an equally powerful socio-economic force - on the other. The balance 
between the two forces is delicate and the public-at-large depends for its security and welfare upon the 
maintenance of that balance. One group concedes certain interests in exchange for concessions from the other. 
There is clearly no correct balance which may be struck giving permanent satisfaction to the two groups, as well 
as securing the public interest. The whole process is inherently dynamic and unstable. Care must be taken then 
in considering whether constitutional protection should be given to one aspect of this dynamic and evolving 
process while leaving the others subject to the social pressures of the day.' 26 
If the law plays an enabling role in the evolution of collective bargaining, it is the interaction 
of employers and organized labour that will ultimately determine its content and effect. 
More particularly, effective trade union organization is crucial. 
This is so because employers in general (as 'bearers of power') can do without collective 
bargaining while workers in general cannot; and, for workers to engage in collective 
bargaining, organization is essential. Today, however, the structural changes produced by 
globalization have impacted severely on the preconditions for trade union organization. This 
process (which adds to the pressure for 'deregulation' of the labour market) is examined 
next. 
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The Effects of Globalization 
The impact of globalization on collective bargaining can be broken down into two facets: its 
impact on (a) trade union membership and (b) collective bargaining coverage. 
(a) Trade union membership 
A study conducted for the ILO in 2000 revealed that trade union membership in many 
countries had peaked in the mid-1980s and thereafter gone into decline. Out of 58 countries 
for which the ILO had sufficient data, 'union density levels fell in 42, were relatively stable 
in four and rose in 12 . Most of the countries where membership increased were developing 
countries experiencing major democratic reforms'. 27 
It cannot, of course, simply be assumed that this decline is due to 'globalization'. In fact, 
the ILO study suggests three reasons: 'cyclical', 'structural' and 'institutional' factors. 
Though this is not the place to 
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examine these phenomena in detail, even a brief overview indicates their connection with 
processes of globalization. 
'Cyclical factors' refers essentially to pressure on trade union membership caused by rising 
unemployment. 28   Unemployment has been described as 'a major constraint on union 
growth and bargaining power'. 29   In one sense the reason is obvious: unemployed 
persons are unlikely to remain trade union members, even if they are eligible to do so. The 
trend is, however, subject to a number of variables. An important variable in some countries 
is the so-called 'Ghent system' 30   which may even result in increasing trade union density 
in periods of high unemployment. 31   Another is bargaining levels: 
 'In countries where unions participate in higher-level or multi-employer systems of collective bargaining, 
unionisation rates tend to be less prone to decline than in countries where bargaining is conducted at the 
company level.' 32 
Under conditions of globalization, however, unemployment (or under-employment) is not 
only cyclical. This becomes apparent from what the ILO report refers to as the 'structural' 
factors impacting on union membership. It goes on to explain: 
 'Where employment is shifting from sectors with high rates of union organization to the less organized service 
sectors, union density levels fall. The downsizing of large and often organized plants and the growth of smaller 
and harder to organize units of employment probably compound this effect. Public sector employment growth 
compensates in part for this effect, but the earlier period of expansion in this generally highly organized sector 
came to an end in many countries in the 1980s. Increased part-time employment, where union presence is 
weak, is a further factor, although a pronounced trend towards increased women's membership of unions has 
worked in the opposite direction in a number of countries. In general, workers with less secure employment 
status are less likely to join unions and the trend 
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 towards short-term contracts and the 'informalization' of employment relationships may explain part of the 
decline in union density in some countries.' 33 
The reality, in other words, is that many full-time jobs in unionized sectors have 
disappeared and many trade unionists have joined the ranks of the unemployed or have 
been relocated to 'atypical' and non-unionized forms of employment. Few would question 
the observation that - 
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 '[t]he decline of trade-union membership has accompanied massive - and largely unacknowledged - increases 
in unemployment .... Official figures are notoriously 'massaged'. They claim that in Canada, the UK and the US 
unemployment actually fell. Many 'new jobs' here are, however, poorly paid, part-time or casual - and many 
people are excluded from official unemployment registers.' 34 
The third set of factors impacting on trade union membership is termed 'institutional'. 35   
This refers to regulatory provisions such as 'tax deduction of union membership dues, 
acceptance and protection of the check-off system, works councils and union access to the 
workplace, unemployment insurance, legal basis for closed shop and secondary pickets, 
legal protection for union organisers and union members', 36   etc. As noted already, where 
bargaining is centralized union density is less likely to decline. It has also been noted that 
the institutional framework of collective bargaining has become a focal point of the 
'deregulationist' agenda. In this context the ILO report makes the following observation: 
 'One of the factors driving globalization and the liberalization and mobility of capital has fundamentally changed 
the bargaining power of firms vis-á-vis governments and workers. The implicit, and sometimes explicit, threat 
of relocation and the transnational nature of firms in some sectors have changed the political economy of 
industrial relations, weakening the bargaining position of workers. Some governments, keen to attract or retain 
investment (foreign and domestic), offer 'discounts' on labour protection, further undermining the ability of 
workers to bargain over decent work.' 37 
While it may be true that 'union density is just one facet of union influence' 38   and 
declining union membership is not in itself decisive, within a voluntary bargaining system it 
is undoubtedly of great 
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importance. 39   For example, as has been demonstrated in the United States, employer 
opposition to collective bargaining can be a formidable obstacle which, in practice, can only 
be overcome by union pressure. For this to happen a relatively high degree of unionization 
is necessary; without it, the principal benefit of collective bargaining from an employer's 
standpoint - the maintenance of industrial peace - is removed from the equation. Thus, 
while declining union density may not necessarily rule out continued union involvement in 
labour market institutions, 40   it does suggest that the outcomes emanating from those 
institutions will be shaped by the interests of business rather than labour. 
(b)  Collective bargaining coverage 
From what has been said, a correlation between trade union density and collective 
bargaining coverage (that is, the percentage of employees and employers subject to 
collective agreements) is to be expected. In fact, the picture is not entirely clear-cut. Firstly, 
bargaining coverage varies greatly from country to country. In most of the 'old' European 
Union member states, for instance, more than two-thirds of employees are covered by 
collective agreements as compared with fewer than half in most of the 'new' EU member 
states. 41   Secondly, collective bargaining coverage is not always consistent with trade 
union density. The OECD provides the following statistics for 25 countries in the year 2000: 
 Union density Collective bargaining coverage 
Australia 24.5 82.5 
Austria 36.5 97.5 
Belgium 55.6 92.5 
Canada 28.1 32.0 
Czech Republic 27.0 27.5 
Denmark 74.4 82.5 
Finland 76.2 92.5 
France 9.7 92.5 
Germany 25.0 68.0 
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Hungary 19.9 32.5 
 
 
2007 ILJ p1405 
Italy 34.9 82.5 
Japan 21.5 17.5 
Korea 11.4 12.5 
Luxembourg 33.6 62.5 
Netherlands 23.2 82.5 
New Zealand 22.7 27.5 
Norway 54.3 72.5 
Poland 14.7 42.5 
Portugal 24.3 82.5 
Slovak Republic 36.1 52.5 
Spain 14.9 82.5 
Sweden 81.1 92.5 
Switzerland 42.5 17.8 
United Kingdom 31.2 32.5 
United States 12.8 14.0 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 2005; available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/24/31781139.xls. 
One key variable that may account for much of the divergence between union density and 
bargaining coverage is the operation of centralized bargaining institutions. Centralized 
bargaining is often accompanied by the extension of collective agreements to non-parties, 
thus enabling trade unions to achieve collective bargaining coverage far exceeding their 
membership. Within Europe, for example, 17 out of 26 countries covered by a recent study 
make provision - as in South Africa - for the extension of collective agreements while only 
nine do not. 42   The importance of this factor is vividly illustrated by the experience of 
Britain, where the abolition of wage councils saw a decline in bargaining coverage from a 
peak of 84-86% in 1975 to less than 50% in 1995. 43   In general, thus, low rates of 
unionization in the absence of institutional support tend to translate into low rates of 
bargaining coverage. 44 
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Against this background, the 'fragmentation' of large-scale mass production in the era of 
globalization, to the extent that it undermines centralized bargaining, threatens a further 
erosion of collective bargaining coverage. The ILO report explains: 
 'Along with shifting the balance of power in industrial relations, globalization has led to a change in the nature 
of the employment (and bargaining) relationship. Much greater attention is given to issues of productivity and 
performance when determining wages. In order to achieve greater internal flexibility, stronger emphasis is 
placed on negotiating issues such as the reorganization of work, flexible working hours, and pay for 
performance and skills within the context of employment relations at the enterprise level. This general tendency 
to negotiate certain issues at an enterprise level has in some countries led to the decentralization of industrial 
relations systems.' 45 
The picture, as noted above, is not uniform. Even so, research suggests that local (plant 
level or single employer) bargaining is gaining ground at the expense of centralized 
bargaining. Schulten explains: 
 'There has been a more or less strong tendency towards decentralisation of collective bargaining in almost all 
countries that still have a dominance of intersectoral or sectoral bargaining. In many countries, such as Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway or Sweden, the higher-level agreements have 
widened the scope for additional bargaining at company level and/or have introduced opening clauses that 
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allow companies to diverge from certain collectively agreed standards. Following this process of organized or 
controlled decentralisation, many countries have seen the emergence of rather differentiated and flexible 
multi-level bargaining systems.' u 46 
Even under the relatively sheltered conditions of Western Europe, it is suggested, the trend 
towards decentralization of collective bargaining may ultimately translate into a declining 
degree of collective bargaining coverage. 47   Schulten offers the following perspective: 
 'Considering the ongoing debates and further pressures for decentralisation, coming in particular from the 
employers' side, it remains an open question whether or not the process of organized decentralisation might 
lead at a certain point to a more fundamental change in bargaining systems. If this were to happen, 
multi-employer agreements might increasingly become empty frameworks, or even be abolished, while 
bargaining coverage would decline significantly.' 48 
To sum up: pressure for decentralized bargaining tends to come from the side of employers 
while trade unions, not surprisingly, tend to resist it. 49   To this extent, the trend towards 
decentralized bargaining may be seen as an assertion of employers' ascendancy in a context 
of declining union power. 
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Reformulating the Question 
If collective bargaining depends on effective worker organization, and trade unions have 
historically emerged as the main form of worker organization, it may seem to follow that the 
decline of trade union density, reflected in declining bargaining coverage, spells the demise 
of collective bargaining. If so, it might seem that labour law should shift its focus to new 
forms of worker organization and new forms of collective interaction. 
In fact, the issue is not so simple. To begin with, the term 'trade union' is usually a 
misnomer in that it suggests an organization based on craft. In practice unions take many 
forms, from company based to industry based to multi-industry. The LRA itself defines 
'trade union' in the broadest possible way as 'an association of employees whose principal 
purpose is to regulate relations between employees and employers'. 50   'Trade unions' as 
such, in other words, are not the problem; trade unions are infinitely flexible and in no way 
incapable of adapting to changing circumstances. The real issue, Bogg suggests, is rather 
more stark: 
 'The regulatory vacuum left by the recession of collective bargaining has not been filled by the emergence of 
other forms of voluntary collective regulation to take its place. Joint consultation committees are much more 
likely to be found in unionized than non-unionized workplaces. As such, consultative committees seem to 
operate as adjuncts to rather than substitutes for collective bargaining. This confirms the thesis that a 
regulatory implication of the decline in collective bargaining is the increasing 'procedural individualization' of the 
employment relation, involving a power shift to employers unilaterally determining contractual relationships on 
a standardized basis.' 51 
The question, thus, is whether 'collective pay-setting' remains viable in a 'fragmented' 
global market place in any shape or form, or whether we are seeing a reversion to 
individualized employment relationships between workers with less power and employers 
with more power than ever before in history. Or can trade unions reinvent themselves in 
such a way as to represent workers in different parts of complex networks of production or 
across transnational industries? 
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This question is considered below from a South African perspective. 
 
 
The Position in South Africa 
At first glance there is little question about the status of collective bargaining South Africa. 
The principle of collective bargaining has become embedded in labour relations over the last 
three decades, and even more so in the law. The Constitution, having entrenched the right 
of workers and employers to form trade unions and employers' organizations, guarantees 
the right of '[e]very trade union, employers' 
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organization and employer ... to engage in collective bargaining'. 52   The Constitutional 
Court (CC) has explained the rationale as follows: 
 'Collective bargaining is based on the recognition of the fact that employers enjoy greater social and economic 
power than individual workers. Workers therefore need to act in concert to provide them collectively with 
sufficient power to bargain effectively with employers.' 53 
Labour law must therefore create conditions for workers to 'act in concert' in order to 
'bargaining effectively with employers'. The Labour Relations Act (LRA) 54   was enacted 
inter alia for this purpose. The way in which it did so caused some controversy. On the one 
hand it did away with the 'duty to bargain' which the Industrial Court had placed on 
employers in certain circumstances 55   and adopted an essentially voluntarist framework. 
56   The drafters of the Act were satisfied that the constitutional right '[did] not require 
Parliament to create a legally enforceable right to bargain in the statute'. 57   At the same 
time the Act set out to 'unashamedly [promote] collective bargaining', inter alia by 
providing trade unions with a series of organizational rights and regulating the right to 
strike. 58   This model, its authors explained, 'is one which allows the parties, through the 
exercise of power, 
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to determine their own [bargaining] arrangements'. 59   Thus, a union could no longer go 
to court for an order requiring an employer to bargain with it. It had to rely on its own 
strength - if needs be, expressed through industrial action - to compel a reluctant employer 
to do so. 
With hindsight, this marked the end of an era in which collective bargaining in South Africa 
had a truly unique character: it could be compelled by order of the Industrial Court where it 
was deemed 'fair', without any formal preconditions (unlike, for example, the statutory 
circumscription of the 'duty to bargain' in the USA). 60   The Constitution abolished this 
regime and replaced it with a 'freedom' rather than an right to engage in collective 
bargaining 61   - but, in doing so, brought collective bargaining in South Africa in line with 
the principles prevailing in most of the industrialized world. 
Even so, it may seem anomalous that a constitutionally guaranteed right should be capable 
of enforcement only by means of self-help. Labour rights in the Constitution, however, are 
classified as socio-economic rights, and it is the exception rather than the rule for such 
rights to be directly enforceable. 62   In the context of collective bargaining the absence of 
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enforceability is even less remarkable. Collective bargaining ultimately depends on the 
power of the parties to compel acceptance of their demands, starting with the demand to 
enter into a bargaining reationship. 63   In this respect South African labour law faithfully 
embraces the 'central purpose' of the Kahn-Freundian paradigm; that is, seeking to ensure 
'the effective operation of a voluntary system of collective bargaining'. 
The Act, however, goes further. Within the broad objective of promoting 'orderly collective 
bargaining' 64   it prioritizes bargaining 
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'at sectoral level'. 65   Sectoral bargaining by means of bargaining councils is the core of 
the system created by the Act. 66   Of critical importance is the power of bargaining 
councils to extend their agreements to all employers in their sector, thereby levelling the 
competitive playing fields on their own terms. 67 
At the same time South Africa has not been immune to 'the cold winds of economic 
liberalisation' that have swept the global economy since the 1980s. Indeed, 'at the very 
moment that democratisation enabled South Africa to rejoin the global economy, those cold 
winds began to blow fiercely through industry'. 68   Trade unions have encountered all the 
problems that have been noted already. Increasing numbers of temporary and part-time 
employees in the workforce, and those disguised as 'independent contractors', have proved 
difficult to organize. 69   Small businesses have remained beyond union organizers' reach. 
The membership of registered trade unions, having peaked at 3 939 075 in 2001, had 
declined to 2 935 864 in 2005. 70 
Apparently contradicting this trend is the increase in the number of employees covered by 
bargaining council agreements from an estimated 2 000 000 in 2002 to 2 358 012 in 2004. 
71   These figures, however, reflect a more complex reality. The number of bargaining 
councils declined from 78 in 2000 to an effective 40 in 2004. 72   Reasons for the growth of 
their coverage may be found in a variety of factors, in particular the massive expansion of 
collective bargaining in the public sector where bargaining councils are compulsory. No less 
important has been the extension of private sector bargaining council agreements to 
non-parties. 73 
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Continued growth of bargaining council coverage, however, cannot be taken for granted. 
While the system appears to be secure in the public sector, its prospects in the private 
sector are less certain. Relentless pressure for market liberalization is manifested in ongoing 
debate about the existence or otherwise of excessive 'rigidities' in the labour market. A focal 
point of the debate is precisely the extension of bargaining council agreements to 
non-parties, which is said to obstruct job creation by small business. While this is not the 
place to delve into the arguments, it may be said that three broad positions have emerged: 
(a) that more flexibility is needed for South Africa to compete in global markets; (b) that 
more regulation is needed to promote collective bargaining and protect workers against 
exploitation; and (c) that the existing regulatory framework strikes a more or less 
appropriate balance between the competing objectives of labour market flexibility and 
employee protection. 74 
In a document produced by the ILO the position is summarized as follows: 
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 'One of the criticisms of centralized bargaining is that it unnecessarily introduces rigidities and bureaucratisation 
to the industrial relations scenario, despite its provisions for exemptions. The argument is that such rigidities in 
the bargaining system can harm the competitiveness of South African industries on global markets .... Many of 
these sentiments were echoed in the debate about the appropriateness of labour legislation for the South 
African labour market. One argument was that there was insufficient labour market flexibility to link pay 
increases to increased productivity.... [T]he ANC government has not been immune to pressures to review 
certain aspects of the legislative framework which have inhibited economic growth and job creation. These 
pressures generally stem from the forces of globalization and the quest to secure greater flexibility in the 
regulation of markets and governance of the actions of agents that are active in those markets.' 75 
Taken together, all these issues pose fundamental questions about the future of collective 
bargaining in South Africa. For example: what will happen if the statutory system continues 
to decline? Does enterprise level bargaining offer a viable alternative? Are trade unions 
equipped to handle it in all sectors? What about the internationalization of production, 
moving various parts of the productive process beyond the jurisdiction of South African law? 
And, given all this, how should the law respond - if at all? 
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Contextualising the Discussion 
Hepple, in an article published in 1995, 76   engaged with similar questions and developed 
a number of propositions which are pertinent to the present discussion. Written after 15 
years of Conservative Party government, the article was set against a backdrop of declining 
trade union density and reduced bargaining coverage which the South African industrial 
relations scene has lately started to resemble. 77   Hepple, too, takes Kahn-Freund's 
concept of labour law as his starting-point. In 1969, he notes: 
 'Kahn-Freund suggested that the law could play three different roles: 
  (1) supporting the autonomous and 'highly developed' system of collective bargaining ('the auxiliary 
function'); (2) providing a code of substantive rules to govern terms and conditions of employment, 
supplementing that provided by collective institutions ('the regulatory function'); and (3) providing the rules of 
'what is allowed and what is forbidden in the conduct of industrial hostilities' ('the restrictive function').' 78 
By the 1990s, however, the situation was 'almost exactly the reverse' of that addressed by 
Kahn-Freund. Having examined the developments of the previous three decades and 
different theoretical models for conceptualizing it, Hepple identifies one of the problems with 
Kahn-Freund's approach 30 years on: 
 'One of the major weaknesses of a framework of labour law which depends primarily on effective collective 
organization by workers is that, in itself, such organization is incapable of helping the weak to organise and to 
articulate their interests. They are dependent upon the strength and goodwill of those who can organise, and of 
the welfare state. Greater legal rights to organise may be of little real value to a new labour force of temporary, 
part-time and 'self-employed' workers under 'personal contracts', working in the shadow of structural 
unemployment, the shrinkage of the welfare state, derecognition and general hostility to trade unions.' 79 
Social rights, he argues, are not 'an immanent development within capitalist society'. 80   
On the contrary, they may be in conflict with market forces and may only be sustainable 
through struggle. By 
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treating such rights as 'fundamental' and entrenching them constitutionally, however, 'we 
shift the resolution of disputes from the political and industrial spheres to the sphere of 
public lawyers and the judiciary; and as Kahn-Freund observed ..., 'it is very easy for judges 
to read their own notions of policy into the bill of rights''. 81 
Against this background, Hepple revisits and reformulates the role of the law as conceived 
of by Kahn-Freund. The 'auxiliary function' of labour law, Hepple argues, 'now needs to 
assume a form which is appropriate to decentralized employment relations and a wide range 
of methods of participation including consultation rights'. 82   The 'regulatory function', too, 
has taken on a new significance in the globalized setting: it will 'be of major importance in 
providing an adequate floor of rights for the growing number of workers under 
'non-standard' contracts.' 83   But, perhaps most importantly, Hepple suggests that a new 
'integrative function' should be added to the functions of labour law identified by 
Kahn-Freund. By this is meant - 
 'innovative 'positive welfare' measures, which would help to combat what in the language of the European 
Union is called the 'social exclusion' of a growing underclass of unemployed or partially employed people. These 
might include the right to acquire vocational skills and further education, financial inducements to employers to 
engage the long-term unemployed, protection against age discrimination, and child care and parental rights 
which would make it easier to combine work with family responsibilities'. 84 
While this approach marks a break with the notion of legal 'abstentionism' from the domain 
of industrial relations, it does not endorse the 'juridification' of labour disputes. Rather, the 
revised 'auxiliary' function of labour law (above) is envisaged as enabling employees to 
engage more effectively with employers in a globalized setting. Beyond this, the 'integrative' 
function of the law is calculated to counteract the erosive effect of market forces on the 
position of employees and bolster their bargaining position. The 'overriding value', Hepple 
concludes, 'is that of equality.... The 'special function' of labour law is to ensure some kind 
of substantive and not merely formal equality between employer and employee'. 85 
This situates the discussion squarely within the South African constitutional discourse. The 
defining source of South African labour law 
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lies in s 23 of the Constitution, which guarantees a universal right to 'fair labour practices' 
as well as a right of all 'workers' to 'engage in collective bargaining' and to strike. The 
purpose of all fundamental rights, however, is to '[affirm] the democratic values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom'. 86   'Equality', in turn, is understood as including 'the full 
and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms'. 87   In seeking to understand the role of 
labour law in this context, it is submitted, the central question must be this: how can 
employees effectively (e)assert their 'right to engage in collective bargaining' in the 
globalized production process? How can trade unions engage meaningfully with 
multinational employers? In short: in a world where the imbalance of power between worker 
and employer has taken on unprecedented dimensions, how can the law - through its 
'auxiliary' and 'integrative' functions - promote substantive equality? 
Reference has been made to the characteristic features of the South African labour market 
which distinguish it from developed market economies. These characteristics are highlighted 
by Fenwick and Kalula in a comparative study of Southern African and East Asian labour 
law. 88   Their starting-point is that labour law in both regions was 'imposed' rather than 
developing organically. While law operates 'according to its own discourses and traditions', it 
is 'interdependent' with other social discourses, leading to outcomes that may be 
unpredictable a priori . In general, therefore, a gap must be expected between 'imposed' 
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law and local practice, and 'quite deep empirical analysis' may be needed to understand 
whether a particular rule or concept will have its intended effect. 89 
Turning to Southern Africa, the authors note that the social dynamics with which imported 
labour law has interacted are very different from those of its European origins. Labour 
markets in Southern Africa are characterized by massive poverty, 'stark income inequality' 
(often coinciding with racial differences), 30 to 40% unemployment, an extremely low skills 
level, an HIV/AIDS pandemic, large-scale labour migration and a vast informal sector in 
which the majority of working people eke out a living. 90   Labour law thus impacts on only 
a minority of the population while the surrounding social realities, combined with lack of 
effective enforcement, dilute its impact still 
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further. 91   To be effective, it is argued, 'labour law in Southern Africa needs to take into 
account the region's particular socio-economic profile [and] develop an indigenous 
paradigm'. While emphasizing that the 'traditional concerns and goals of labour law as 
developed in the industrialized world are by no means irrelevant' to workers in formal 
employment, nor for ensuring 'flexibility and efficiency to compete in global economic 
markets', the authors suggest that the 'true and necessary domain of labour law' is wider: 
'job creation, control of immigration, training and education of workers, and the provision of 
social security are all immediate concerns for the Southern African workforce'. 92 
These findings, it is submitted, do not contradict Hepple's analysis but supplement it - 
specifically, by adding substance to the notion of the 'integrative' function of labour law 
under Southern African conditions. The need to combat the 'social exclusion' of an 
'underclass of unemployed or partially employed people' is infinitely starker in Southern 
Africa than in Europe. Even more clearly, labour law must be understood in the context of 
the labour market as a whole. 93   At the same time, this 'integrative function' does not 
detract from the remaining functions of labour law. If anything, it may be argued that 
Fenwick and Kalula understate the contrast between the industrialized heartland of the 
South African economy and the general underdevelopment of the region as a whole. 94   
The total number of employees and self-employed persons in South Africa rose from 9,61 
million in 1995 to 10,54 million in 1999, of whom some 7,28 million were employed in the 
formal sector. 95   With a working population this size the 'auxiliary' function of labour law 
must have more than the relatively marginal influence ascribed to it in the subcontinent as 
a whole. A majority of the South African population depend on work in the formal sector 
and, faced with the power of corporate and global employers, 
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rely critically on the protection of labour law to give substance to their right to equality. The 
erosion of collective bargaining can only undermine this right. The question is how the 
constitutional goal of substantive equality can be promoted on the uneven playing field of 
the workplace, swept by the winds of globalization. 
 
 
Possible Roads Forward 
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To search for a simple solution to the problems that have been noted is likely to be futile. 
Rather, what is needed is to examine the actual dynamics of labour relations to see if there 
are lines of development along which collective bargaining and labour law might evolve into 
the future. Such an exercise must necessarily be complex and cannot be attempted fully 
within the scope of this article. Two developments, however, will be noted which offer 
possibilities for South African trade unions and employers to move beyond existing 
relationships and create new patterns of engagement that may be more attuned to the 
realities of the global market-place. 
At workplace level 
A fundamental challenge is to develop bargaining structures which, in Hepple's words, will 
be 'appropriate to decentralized employment relations' and may include 'a wide range of 
methods of participation including consultation rights'. 96   In South Africa, disappointingly, 
this challenge has largely been obscured by the controversy surrounding the provisions for 
the establishment of workplace forums in chapter V of the LRA. 
Much of the controversy may be due to the fact that workplace forums were originally 
presented as serving an unfortunate purpose: that of facilitating 'major restructuring' of the 
economy by promoting a shift 'from adversarial collective bargaining on all matters to joint 
problem-solving and participation on certain [production-related] subjects'. This would be 
done by creating a 'second channel' of industrial relations, partly modelled on the works 
councils of Germany and the Netherlands. 97   The message thus sent to unions was 
ominous: restructuring and job losses that unions would fight tooth and nail in the 
bargaining arena were expected to find greater acceptance if negotiated with 
'non-adversarial' workplace forums. Not even the fact that the LRA ultimately gave trade 
unions all but absolute control over workplace forums could disarm unions' suspicions or 
dispel the belief that workplace forums, however constituted, would inevitably serve as cats' 
paws for employers and sow divisions among workers. 98   Hepple's assessment of the fate 
of the British Industrial Relations Act, 
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with the change of the words 'United States' and 'Britain' to 'Germany' and 'South Africa', 
might have applied equally to chapter V of the LRA: 
 'The Act failed because it tried to bring about too drastic a change in existing behaviour by means of law; it was 
based on the assumption (mistaken at the time) that employers would use the law and that unions would 
co-operate; and the transplantation of legal institutions from the United States took insufficient account of the 
different social and political climate in Britain.' 99 
Twelve years on, the LRA's provision for workplace forums is seen as a dead letter. A recent 
discussion document of the African National Congress concludes that it 'does not make 
sense to keep this legislative provision in the labour law whilst clearly not helping - in its 
current form - towards worker participation in the workplace'. 100 
Such a view may be too limited. It should not be forgotten that the resurgence of 
independent trade unionism in the 1970s started at workplace level. Only with the growing 
strength of the unions in the 1980s did the focus shift to sectoral bargaining. 101   
However, dual level bargaining has remained an abiding feature of the system, with 
minimum wages and conditions often negotiated at sectoral level and actual wages and 
conditions at workplace level. 102   Moreover, despite their aversion to workplace forums, 
trade unions have been less averse to creating non-statutory consultative structures at 
workplace level by means of collective agreements. 103   Union opposition is thus directed 
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not so much against decentralized bargaining as against workplace forums as an institution. 
Strategically, however, the main focus remains on the establishment of bargaining councils. 
It remains to be seen how viable this policy will be in the longer run. Since bargaining 
councils are voluntary, their existence depends on employers' willingness to join them or 
unions' ability to persuade employers to do so. If union strength declines, their ability to 
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pressurize employers - as well as the incentive for employers to join bargaining councils - is 
likewise reduced. In this event, a reversion to plant-level bargaining will not automatically 
follow: unions lacking the strength to initiate bargaining at sectoral level may find it hard to 
initiate bargaining at any level. 
Under these circumstances, it may be argued, the establishment of workplace forums may 
give unions footholds in workplaces which they might otherwise be unable to secure 104   
and, by creating negotiating relationships, (re-)establish a basis for collective bargaining at 
workplace level. 
Such a radical reorientation is not on the union agenda at present. It will involve 
reconceptualizing workplace forums from Trojan horses of employer power to points of 
support for workplace bargaining and local union structures. This is unlikely to happen for as 
long as unions see bargaining councils as their primary focus. Change is only likely if 
disenchantment with sectoral bargaining (and other, more orthodox strategies) sets in. If 
and when such a point may be reached is impossible to predict. For example, it cannot be 
excluded that certain non-COSATU unions may identify tactical advantages to be gained 
through the establishment of workplace forums and use it to secure their position in 
workplaces where they have majority membership. If so, workplace forums may at last start 
coming into their own, albeit for purposes different from those which the drafters of the Act 
had suggested. 
For the moment, the question remains open whether workplace forums are a dead letter or 
an idea ahead of its time. 
At transnational level 
If decentralization of production presents a major challenge to traditional bargaining 
structures in South Africa, the internationalization of production presents a challenge of a 
different order. An ILO report comments: 
 'One of the factors driving globalization and the liberalization and mobility of capital has fundamentally changed 
the bargaining power of firms vis-á-vis governments and workers. The implicit, and sometimes explicit, threat 
of relocation and the transnational nature of firms in some sectors have changed the political economy of 
industrial relations, weakening the bargaining position of workers. Some governments, keen to attract or retain 
investment (foreign and domestic), offer 'discounts' on labour protection, further undermining the 
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 ability of workers to bargain over decent work.... As the contours of markets are no longer limited to national 
boundaries, this has direct implications for the ability to bargain collectively through national labour market 
structures.' 105 
Internationally, trade unions have begun to develop new strategies to deal with this 
situation. Three types of responses are noted in the ILO report: 
•    'International collective bargaining' between international union structures and 
international employers' organizations. For example, a collective agreement was 
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signed in 2000 between the International Transport Workers' Federation and the 
International Maritime Employers' Committee. 106 
•    Coordination of bargaining activities internationally. For example, again in the 
transport sector, the International Transport Workers' Federation has established 
working parties to bring together affiliated unions from different countries to 
coordinate their bargaining strategies vis-á-vis international airline alliances such as 
Star and OneWorld. 107 
•    International (or global) framework agreements between international trade union 
federations and multinational employers to regulate organizational rights. The 
International Transport Workers' Federation explains: 
 '[Global framework agreements] are usually reached between a multinational company's management and a 
Global Union Federation. There are about 12 of these agreements so far. Most of them include a commitment 
by the company to observe ILO core labour standards, to guarantee certain rights to their workers, plus a 
mechanism for monitoring in which unions play a major role. The commitment often extends not only to the 
company's own operations around the world, but puts pressure on its suppliers and sub-contractors as well. 
These agreements are so new that it is not yet clear how they will impact on collective bargaining by unions at 
a local or national level. The agreements often state explicitly that they do not replace local level industrial 
negotiations.' 108 
The CSR factor 
In recent years multinational corporations have come under increasing media scrutiny and 
have been placed under growing pressure from an array of civil society and political 
organizations to acknowledge 
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their broader responsibilities, not only to shareholders but to their employees and the 
communities in which they operate. 109   This has led to the formulation of guidelines for 
'corporate social responsibility' (CSR) by various international organizations, from the United 
Nations to the Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development (OECD), and the 
adoption of CSR codes by numerous corporations. In Europe, in particular, the process has 
gathered considerable momentum. Following earlier initiatives, the executive of the EU in 
early 2006 called on European companies to - 
 'continue to promote CSR globally with a view to maximising the contribution of enterprises to the achievement 
of the UN Millennium Development Goals. The ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning MNEs and 
Social Policy, the OECD Guidelines for MNEs and the UN Global Compact, as well as other reference instruments 
and initiatives, provide international benchmarks for responsible business conduct'. 110 
Though lacking the force of law, these benchmarks appear to have some impact. 111   For 
present purposes it is especially interesting to note the guidelines laid down by the ILO 
Tripartite Declaration. 112   With reference to collective bargaining it requires inter alia the 
following: 
 '50. Measures appropriate to national conditions should be taken, where necessary, to encourage and 
promote the full development and utilization of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers 
or employers' organizations and workers' organizations, with a view to the regulation of terms and 
conditions of employment by means of collective agreements. 
 '51. Multinational enterprises, as well as national enterprises, should provide workers' representatives with 
such facilities as may be necessary to assist in the development of effective collective agreements. 
 '52.  Multinational enterprises should enable duly authorized representatives of the workers in their 
employment in each of the countries in which they operate to conduct negotiations with representatives 
of management who are authorized to take decisions on the matters under negotiation.' 
Such benchmarks, it would seem, open up room to argue that 'effective collective 
agreements' should, in the context of transnational operations, extend across national 
boundaries. 
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In practice, the codes of conduct adopted by multinational corporations 
2007 ILJ p1431 
vary enormously. 113   Commitments in the field of labour relations, however, tend to be 
general rather than specific. For example, Shell's General Business Principles describe its 
'responsibilities to employees' as follows: 
 'To respect the human rights of our employees and to provide them with good and safe working conditions, and 
competitive terms and conditions of employment. 
 To promote the development and best use of the talents of our employees; to create an inclusive work 
environment where every employee has an equal opportunity to develop his or her skills and talents. 
 To encourage the involvement of employees in the planning and direction of their work; to provide them with 
channels to report concerns....' 114 
But, despite their generality and lack of enforceability, there is evidence that CSR codes 
may have some impact on labour relations. A recent study of CSR practice concluded that 
'[labour] rights enjoy greater business recognition than any other human rights'. It 
continues: 
 'Some 66 percent of the companies recognize both freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. 
Nearly 75 percent of European companies recognize both rights. In contrast, 63 percent of North American 
companies and around 50 percent of companies from each of the remaining regions recognize these rights ....' 
Companies almost always recognize the freedom of association and the right to collective 
bargaining in tandem. Commitments are made using language like, 'respects', 'allows', 
'recognizes', or 'does not impede' with regard to these rights. In addition, freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining are frequently recognized in broad terms, 
with no limitations. Several companies even commit to the freedom to organize and bargain 
in the presence of local laws restricting the rights: 
 'In situations or countries in which the rights regarding freedom of association and collective bargaining are 
restricted by law, parallel means of independent and free organization and bargaining shall be facilitated.' 
(Quote from a German Retail Company.) 
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 'However, some companies narrow the rights. For example, some limit recognition to the scope of national law 
or only recognize unions that represent a certain percentage of employees.' 115 
The perspective of 'a combination of decentralisation and transnational bargaining within 
transnational firms' has already been noted. This prospect is premised on 'product market 
integration' that will, in the absence of an adapted bargaining agenda, favour multinational 
employers vis-á-vis national unions. From a trade union standpoint this might translate into 
pursuing a strategy whereby 'decentralisation to the firm level is combined with 
transnational cooperation of trade unions within large transnational firms'. 116   Booth et al 
explain: 
 'Why might such a development occur? One answer is that it provides a way for unions to defend themselves. 
National trade unions engaging with transnational firms will increasingly find it natural to cooperate, in order to 
strengthen their bargaining position vis-á-vis the transnational firms (who can threaten relocation of production 
into other countries).' 117 
Much research remains to be done about the impact of CSR in South Africa, where-in 
contrast to 'corporate governance' 118   and 'corporate social investment' 119   - the 
concept enjoys little currency. That this will remain so, however, cannot be assumed. In 
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general, increasing public exposure places corporations under more pressure to be seen to 
comply with public policy. Commitment on the part of an employer to 'respect the human 
rights of employees', in turn, may provide a relatively conducive environment for exercising 
the right to freedom of association and the right to engage in collective bargaining. By the 
same token, a commitment to provide employees with 'good and safe working conditions, 
and competitive terms and conditions of employment' may create a potential framework for 
a bargaining agenda. 
Given their voluntary nature, the pressure exerted by CSR norms may be described as 
political rather than legal. Political pressure, however, 
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may nonetheless be significant in a country where the right to engage in collective 
bargaining is constitutionally entrenched and legally promoted. In addition, the 
constitutional duty to 'respect, protect, promote and fulfil' the fundamental values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom - reflected in the purpose of the LRA to advance 'social 
justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace' 120   - is binding also on 
employers. 121   Taken together, these various factors may add significantly to the 
pressure that trade unions could mobilize in their efforts to secure or maintain bargaining 
relationships, not only within South Africa but within transnational companies. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The discussion has by no means been exhaustive. Several important issues have hardly 
been touched on. For example: 
•    The question of trade union organization and collective bargaining in small and 
medium enterprises, which has generated a major literature in itself, 122   is clearly 
significant in the context of decentralization of production. The extent to which 
national and international framework agreements may seek to regulate supply chains 
of large corporations, which are likely to include many small and medium enterprises, 
is one of the questions remaining to be examined. 
•    Administrative wage-regulating mechanisms, such as ministerial determinations and 
sectoral determinations in terms of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 123   are 
intended to establish minimum conditions of employment in sectors where collective 
bargaining is absent. An obvious question is the extent to which the interests of 
employers and workers are necessarily reflected in such instruments. A possible 
answer is the degree to which the investigation which must precede a sectoral 
determination 124   may allow the Department of Labour to facilitate de facto 
negotiation between employers and employee representatives as a means of 
identifying appropriate terms and conditions of employment. 125 
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•    Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal and Labour Appeal Court in labour 
disputes have resurrected common-law remedies over issues where statutory 
remedies have been created. 126   The full significance of this development remains 
to be seen. It is, however, interesting that the courts are showing an unprecedented 
willingness to revert to the common-law roots of employment law at a time when the 
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allegedly restrictive nature of the statutory dispensation has been placed in issue. The 
questions arises whether decisions such as these may be seen as straws in the wind 
for the (e)assertion of common-law rights also in the area of collective bargaining, to 
the detriment of the model created by the LRA. 
•    Concern has been also been raised by the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
NUMSA & others v Fry's Metals (Pty) Ltd that employees may fairly be dismissed 
following bargaining deadlock about proposed changes to working practices, provided 
those changes serve genuine operational requirements and dismissal is not 
conditional. In one sense the decision is unexceptionable, in that the mere fact that 
the proposed changes had been subject to collective bargaining says nothing about 
the presence or absence of genuine operational reasons for dismissal. The changes 
themselves, however, may also be seen as a manifestation of insidious global market 
forces compelling restructuring on pain of dismissal. Viewed thus, it amounts to a 
fundamental curtailing of the bargaining process by transferring classic bargaining 
topics to the ultimately non-negotiable sphere of managerial decision making. 
What is certain is that the future of collective bargaining and that of labour law are 
intertwined and that they face common challenges. Labour law in South Africa, as in many 
other countries, has been premised on the principle that its 'central purpose', alongside 
individual employee protection, is the regulation of collective bargaining. Any erosion of 
collective bargaining must call into question that purpose. The law can do little or nothing to 
reverse the trends undermining existing forms of trade union organization and collective 
bargaining. Widespread pressure from employers for greater liberalization of labour markets 
makes it all the more unlikely that a legal solution will be sought. The great imponderable is 
the new-found ascendancy enjoyed by employers in many sectors and the ends to which it 
will be turned. Democratic society cannot function without machinery to regulate collective 
terms and conditions of employment by means of representative institutions. The question 
is how collective 
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bargaining, in responding to broader socio-economic pressures, may need to evolve in order 
to continue performing that function. 
Possible lines of development at both workplace and transnational levels have been noted. 
From an international standpoint, according to one study, 'a combination of decentralisation 
and transnational bargaining within transnational firms' is the most likely perspective in the 
longer term. Booth et al explain: 
 'It may over time become natural for unions in production units in different countries within large transnational 
firms to cooperate, in order to strengthen their bargaining position towards the employer. The motivation would 
be to counter the threat of the employer to move production to the most low-cost unit. The European Works 
Councils may serve as vehicles for transnational bargaining of this type by creating standardised and 
institutionalised networks of employees across borders, which reduce coordination costs. This could add a force, 
this time on the union side, working towards disintegrating national industry agreements and against norms of 
national solidarity.' 127 
Given the expansion and increasing heterogeneity of the EU, it is becoming less far-fetched 
to transpose arguments from the European context to the broader international context. 
This should not obscure specific challenges facing trade unions locally in developing 
transnational structures. On the other hand, globalization has created a setting where 
purely national institutions will increasingly become the exception and transnational 
arrangements increasingly the rule. In this context it is possible that the momentum 
favouring the development of transnational bargaining structures will tend to increase and 
the barriers will tend to diminish. 
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What does this say about the future of labour law? As always, it is submitted, the law is 
likely to respond to and regulate that which employers and labour bring about in practice. In 
formulating that response the various developments touched on above will need to be 
studied more carefully; any amendment of the legal framework of collective bargaining 
should be informed by a thorough understanding of emerging trends which are capable of 
carrying the institution into the future. Anything else is likely to be ineffective or, at worst, 
disrupt the 'delicate balance' between the socio-economic forces of capital and labour on 
which the 'security and welfare' of people in society at any given moment continue to 
depend. 128 
 * I am indebted to the outstanding original research on the operation of the bargaining council system carried out 
by Shane Godfrey, Johann Maree and Jan Theron under the auspices of the Labour & Enterprise Policy 
Research Group at the University of Cape Town, as yet unpublished, as well as to comment  offered by 
Craig Bosch on an earlier draft of this text. 
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